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Non-state Actors and Mine Action:
Complications and Solutions
The role of non-state actors in mine action is an important and complicated issue to
consider. While the United Nations does not recognize NSAs as official representatives
of countries or governments, NSAs can still play an active part in reducing landmine
and weapons proliferation around the globe. This article discusses the complications
surrounding NSAs and the efforts being taken to include them in mine-action discussions.

by Cory Kuklick and Zach Wall [ Center for International Stabilization and Recovery ]

A

s defined by Geneva Call, an armed
non-state actor is “any armed actor
operating outside state control that
uses force to achieve its political/quasi-political
objective. Such actors include armed groups,
rebel groups, liberation movements and de facto
governments.”1 Many of the wars and conflicts
being fought in the post-Cold-War environment involve actors outside of state control,
and a rise in globalization has made financial
and technical resources more available to these
entities. Because the majority of conflicts today
are fought with at least one party that does not
acknowledge the legitimacy of the recognized
government, complications arise with international humanitarian law on how to effectively
engage and monitor these groups, as they are
not bound by international treaties.

used AP mines, including victim-activated improvised explosive devices.2 The use of victimactivated IEDs, which are considered AP mines
and prohibited by the Convention, account for
most NSA mine use in recent years. (While
NSAs frequently use command-detonated
IEDs as well, these IEDs are not considered AP
mines under the criteria of the Convention.)
Only a handful of non-state actors, notably the

NSAs and Landmines

Due to their widespread availability and
cheap cost, anti-personnel mines were the
weapon of choice for many NSAs throughout
the latter part of the last century. However,
due to stockpile destruction and the provisions
against the production and trade of AP mines
included in the Ottawa Convention, the availability of factory-made landmines has been
drastically reduced over the past decade. Nevertheless, from 2003–2005, at least 60 NSAs
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Anti-personnel mine.
Photo courtesy of matt bolton

Taliban in Afghanistan and the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka, emplaced
new factory-made or self-produced AP mines
during the past two years.3,4

Radio-controlled improvised explosive device.
Photo courtesy of Ejército de Colombia – Escuela de Ingenieros Militares

While landmine use has been decreasing overall, the use of AP mines
by NSAs still occurs more frequently
than by government forces. During
2008 and 2009, for instance, NSAs
used AP mines in at least seven
countries, three of which are States
Parties to the Ottawa Convention.
By contrast, the government forces of only two nations did so during
the same period.4 When states deploy landmines, they generally do so
to defend an area or disrupt an enemy. On the other hand, NSAs usually deploy them indiscriminately.
They are also more likely than states
to lay landmines near civilian-dense
areas, such as schools or well-traveled
roads, to cause as much disruption
and terror among the population as
possible. NSAs often lay landmines
without conventional patterns, and
maps or indicators that specify
landmine locations following the
conclusion of combat generally do
not exist.
The purpose for mine use varies among these armed groups: factors including whether or not the
group controls an area or terrain

and the group’s access to various
mine types affect how NSAs use
landmines. One constant, however, is that the mines used are usually cheap and easy to operate and
modify (allowing them to be used
as victim-activated IEDs). Over the
past decade, due to the moratoria

on mine transfers imposed by the
Ottawa Convention and other export bans, the global trade of AP
mines has consisted mostly of lowlevel, illicit trafficking. As a result,
AP mines have become less accessible to NSAs by traditional means,
such as purchasing them from
neighboring states. In some cases,
NSAs will acquire landmines from
the state in which they are fighting,
whether through looting weapons
caches or by removing landmines
already laid by the state.2 The black
market is another source where
NSAs can obtain landmines, as
these mines are not under effective
state control. A large black market
began in Iraq following the start of
the Iraq War (2003–present), with
landmines belonging to the former Iraqi state now being sold and
transferred throughout the country
to insurgents.2

A looted Iraqi Army installation, containing 155mm rocket-assisted and 155mm
boat-tail high-explosive artillery shells. Iraqi Army Ammunition Depot, Shaykh
Na im, Kumayt, Maysan governorate, south eastern Iraq.
©jonathanolley.com
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In most conflict zones today, however, NSAs are
less likely to emplace factory-manufactured AP mines
than they are to deploy victim-activated or commanddetonated IEDs. IEDs are common among NSAs because the materials used to make the devices are
readily available. For instance, NSAs can modify AP
mines and other conventional ordnance to construct
these devices. Due to the unpredictable nature of these
weapons, and the way they can be easily disguised as
commonly found items—such as piles of rocks or even
as bags of candy—IED use can be harder to control. Because non-state armed groups use landmines and IEDs
in unconventional ways that frequently target or endanger civilian populations, the necessity for monitoring
and preventing their use is that much more pressing.

Geneva Call is a Swiss-based NGO established in March 2000 that works with
and engages NSAs to respect international humanitarian law. Since international humanitarian law focuses on states, and
consequently, NSAs cannot become members to international treaties, Geneva Call
was established to create dialogues and
encourage NSAs to change their behavior
and respect certain humanitarian norms,
including a ban on all AP mines. While

Engaging NSAs through Geneva Call

Because they are not recognized as states, NSAs cannot become signatories to international legal instruments such as the Ottawa Convention, even if they
choose to adhere to the ban’s principles and initiatives.
In order to bring NSAs to the mine-ban table, Geneva
Call established the Deed of Commitment for Adherence
to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action, which encourages NSAs to follow the
guidelines put forth in the Ottawa Convention. The Deed
of Commitment also enables NSAs to declare adherence
to a set of humanitarian principles and in turn project
themselves in a more positive light within the international community for not using AP mines. Furthermore,
including NSAs in disarmament discourse also encourages them to pursue legitimate avenues for reaching their
political goals, rather than organized violence. By promoting dialogue and transparency, Geneva Call ultimately hopes to persuade these groups to adhere to the
same basic humanitarian standards expected of states.
Since 2001, 41 NSAs from Burma/Myanmar, Burundi,
India, Iran, Iraq, the Philippines, Somalia, Sudan, Turkey
and Western Sahara have signed the Deed of Commitment.5 Signatory actors commit themselves to 10 pillars
of mine action, including banning AP mine use, cooperating and taking part in stockpile destruction, allowing
the monitoring and verification of their commitment by
Geneva Call, and treating the commitment as a step toward international humanitarian law.
Last year four new members signed the Deed of Commitment, and 40 signatories met in June 2009 at Geneva
Call’s Second Meeting of Signatories to the Deed of Com-

52

feature | the journal of ERW and mine action | summer 2010 | 14.2

Geneva Call focuses on the landmine issue, it also engages NSAs on subjects
such as small arms and light weapons,
child soldiers, and gender.

mitment, where participants discussed landmine issues
as well as other topics such as protection of women and
children in armed conflict. Geneva Call continues to
reach out to nonsignatories in the hopes of persuading
them to join the Deed of Commitment and plans to continue following up with signatories to guarantee their
commitment to ban AP mine use.
In April 2010, two new actors—the Kurdistan Democratic Party–Iran and the Free Life Party of Kurdistan/Liberation Forces of Eastern Kurdistan—added
their signatures to the Deed of Commitment. As a result, all Iranian and Kurdish armed NSAs have banned
AP mine use.
However, one downside to negotiating with NSAs
is that it potentially lends legitimacy to insurgent and
terrorist organizations that they do not necessarily warrant. In effect, these groups may capitalize on
that credibility and transform it into popular support
and new recruitment. When international organizations recognize and engage with NSAs, the latter may
enjoy a new bargaining position that they may in turn
use to advance their international standing. NSAs can
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Improvised landmine with trip-wire activation.
Photo courtesy of Ejército de Colombia–Escuela de Ingenieros Militares

then use that momentum to their
advantage by recruiting new members or securing new resources from
interested sponsors. Furthermore,
just because NSA’s have abandoned
the use of AP mines does not guarantee that they will not continue
campaigns of violence against government and civilian targets using
other tactics and different varieties of lethal force. In fact, they may
substitute their former weapons of
choice with innovative, more effective alternatives.

disarmament campaigns illustrate
the need to continue engaging NSAs
in dialogue. Over the past decade
Geneva Call has shown the possibility to successfully include NSAs in
such activities, although much work
remains. Many NSAs still do not adhere to international humanitarian
law and continue to indiscriminately place landmines and deploy IEDs,
illustrating that their continued use
remains a major obstacle in mine action and weapons mitigation.
See Endnotes, Page 81
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Conclusion

The complications surrounding
NSAs and including them in a mine
ban, mine clearance initiatives or
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